The Hague's spending pledge needs a capability audit

The Hague summit declaration commits allies to a larger defence and security-related spending effort by 2035, including at least 3.5 per cent of GDP for core defence requirements within the wider 5 per cent commitment. [1] The pledge changes the political scale of the debate. Its military significance will depend on what expenditure produces.

A spending ratio is an input measure. It does not show whether forces are available, equipment can be maintained or infrastructure supports the functions allies have promised to perform. Europe should treat the Hague commitment as the beginning of a capability audit rather than an invitation to relabel existing expenditure until the accounting target is reached.

What the number is for

A larger budget can finance urgent gaps, modernisation and resilience. It can also fund poorly coordinated purchases, cost overruns or programmes whose strategic rationale has weakened. The distinction will not be visible in the aggregate ratio.

Governments should connect major spending increases to defined functions and delivery milestones. The question is not merely how much a ministry can absorb, but which commitment becomes more dependable because of the additional resources. Public reporting can describe progress without disclosing sensitive operational details.

The denominator matters as well. A GDP ratio changes with economic conditions, so it should not be mistaken for a stable multi-year procurement schedule. Industrial planning requires predictable orders and financing. Budget commitments need to translate a political metric into practical arrangements that firms and defence institutions can use.

Capabilities and resilience are linked

The declaration's wider framework recognises that defence depends on more than military equipment. Infrastructure and related resilience can support readiness. But this breadth creates an accounting risk: ordinary spending may be presented as strategic without demonstrating the relevant contribution.

A credible test should begin with the function served. Does a project remove a documented constraint, improve continuity or enable an agreed defence task? If so, the supporting case can be examined. If the relationship is merely that the project might be useful in some unspecified emergency, the justification is weak.

This is especially important for dual-use infrastructure. Civilian benefits are valuable and can strengthen the case for investment. They should not replace an assessment of whether the project actually meets the security requirement claimed on its behalf.

Industry needs credible demand

Producers need a view of orders, specifications and support obligations before expanding capacity. A political commitment without contracts may generate cautious preparation rather than substantial investment. Governments should reduce unnecessary uncertainty in demand while preserving accountability for price and performance.

Joint procurement can help where requirements are compatible. It can also become slow if every participant insists on a separate national variation. The objective should be usable interoperability and reliable delivery, not agreement on a perfect common product that arrives too late.

A lead-buyer model may be appropriate for some purchases, with clear rules for participation and oversight. Other programmes may require a different arrangement. The key is an authority able to make decisions and resolve trade-offs, rather than a coordination process whose only certain output is more consultation.

The operating life counts

Buying equipment is only the first financial commitment. Training, maintenance, replacement parts and upgrades determine whether it remains useful. A procurement programme that underfunds those functions can improve the acquisition statistics while leaving readiness weak.

Ministries should evaluate lifecycle costs and the availability of support under adverse conditions. This does not require producing every input domestically. It requires understanding which dependencies are hard to substitute and arranging credible alternatives where the consequences justify them.

Personnel are equally important. Skilled people cannot be recruited, trained and retained instantly. A spending plan that assumes unlimited technical and operational capacity is not credible. Education, career structures and predictable demand need to be considered alongside procurement.

A bargain that lasts a decade

The time horizon to 2035 spans several budget cycles and potentially several governments. Commitments will be more durable if citizens can understand the expected security benefit and the safeguards against waste. A pledge sustained only through urgency can weaken as other pressures return.

Parliamentary oversight should examine both delivery and opportunity cost. Defence is a legitimate priority, but so are the public services and investments with which it competes. Pretending that every increase can occur without trade-offs undermines trust when those trade-offs become visible.

Governments should therefore explain the sequence: which gaps are urgent, which investments take longer and which activities can be delivered collectively. A clear sequence helps distinguish readiness from prestige and makes it easier to assess whether spending is being directed towards the stated purpose.

When audit becomes delay

Critics will say that Europe already knows it needs more capability and that another assessment risks postponing action. This concern is justified if an audit becomes a precondition for every urgent purchase. It should not.

The appropriate approach is concurrent action and review. Address well-established shortfalls immediately while testing the assumptions behind longer programmes. A good audit accelerates delivery by identifying constraints and stopping weak projects, rather than adding a universal layer of approval.

The opposite danger is to assume that urgency makes every proposed expenditure sensible. In a rapidly expanding budget, suppliers and institutions can face weaker incentives to control cost. Independent scrutiny becomes more valuable, not less, when money is being committed quickly.

Compare outcomes, not totals

Allies contribute through different geographies, force structures and specialisations. A common spending commitment should not obscure those differences. The practical question is whether the alliance has the required combination of functions and whether national contributions fit together.

Coordination should identify duplication that adds little value and gaps that remain unaddressed because they are less politically visible. It should also recognise that some redundancy is useful insurance. The goal is not theoretical efficiency under ideal conditions, but dependable performance under plausible stress.

A useful review would distinguish promised capacity from available capacity and available capacity from sustained capacity. Those are different standards. A force that can deploy briefly but cannot be supported over time offers a different strategic contribution from one backed by maintenance and replenishment.

A review that can change a decision

Milestones should trigger real choices. If a programme is delayed, authorities should assess whether the problem is temporary, whether the requirement has changed or whether another approach would deliver sooner. A review that can only request more money is not an effective control.

Contracts should also allocate risk sensibly. Governments may need to support capacity expansion, but they should not absorb every cost while leaving suppliers with little incentive to deliver. Transparent performance arrangements can protect both continuity and the public interest.

There is a wider European economic opportunity in a more coherent demand signal, but it should not be exaggerated. Defence spending is not automatically an efficient industrial policy for every region or technology. The primary test remains whether it delivers the required security function; broader economic benefits should be demonstrated rather than assumed.

Infrastructure planning needs the same discipline. A project can have genuine security value while being poorly sequenced with other investments. Shared planning should examine whether the necessary staff, equipment and permissions will be ready together. Completing one visible component early does not guarantee that the resulting capability is available.

An equipment programme under audit

Suppose a ministry funds a substantial acquisition and reports that contracted units will arrive within an agreed period. A capability audit would ask what else must be ready at delivery: trained personnel, maintenance arrangements, compatible support and the infrastructure needed for the intended function. The acquisition milestone is necessary, but it is only one part of readiness.

If those dependencies have different owners, the audit should identify a single authority responsible for the combined outcome. Otherwise each organisation can meet its own narrow target while the operational function remains unavailable. The problem would then be coordination rather than a simple shortage of money.

The review should also examine the assumptions behind future operating costs. A low initial purchase price can create substantial later obligations. A more expensive option may sometimes offer better availability or easier maintenance. The comparison should therefore use the required service over time, not only the contract value at signature.

Finally, the programme needs a way to learn from early delivery. Experience with training and support can justify adjustments before later purchases are locked in. That flexibility should be designed into the process where feasible, while preserving enough stability for industry to plan. It is one way to reconcile urgent expansion with responsible use of a much larger budget.

Oversight should include the quality of cost estimates. A programme built on an implausibly low operating budget can crowd out future readiness when unavoidable expenses emerge, even if its initial acquisition appears to meet the spending plan.

The Hague commitment provides political room for a substantial strengthening of allied defence. Europe should use that room to purchase dependable capability, not merely a compliant expenditure total. The strongest evidence of resolve will be commitments that can be fulfilled, maintained and scrutinised. A capability audit is how a spending pledge becomes a credible strategic promise.