NATO raises the bill to 5 percent. Allies leave The Hague with the hard part still at home.

The number was decided before the leaders arrived in The Hague. The summit was about making it sound like a promise every ally could live with.

On 25 June, NATO leaders endorsed a new target of spending 5 percent of gross domestic product each year on defence and security-related activity by 2035. At least 3.5 percent is for core military requirements. Up to 1.5 percent can cover infrastructure, cyber defence, resilience and the industrial base.

The pledge more than doubles the alliance's old 2 percent benchmark. It is also a political answer to Donald Trump's demand that European allies carry more of the cost of their security. The declaration repeats the collective-defence commitment under Article 5 and identifies Russia as the long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.

Unanimity gives the target authority. It does not give 32 governments the same starting point, the same budget rules or the same definition of what can be counted. Spain had already said it could not meet the target as written, and the final language leaves room for national plans and a review in 2029.

The summit consequently delivered a clear headline with a long implementation tail. Governments must write multi-year budgets, expand defence industries and persuade voters to accept choices between security spending and other public priorities. NATO can set a benchmark. It cannot pass a national budget.

The timing matters for Ukraine and for Europe. The war continues, US policy is less predictable and European governments are discussing how to provide more of their own deterrence. The pledge gives those discussions a common number. It does not resolve which capabilities are most urgent or how they will be shared.

What the 5 percent means

The new target has two parts.

The first is a commitment to spend 3.5 percent of GDP on core defence requirements by 2035. That category covers military forces, equipment, readiness and the capabilities NATO's defence planning process identifies. It is closer to the traditional defence budget than the broader headline.

The second allows up to 1.5 percent for defence and security-related spending. NATO lists critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, resilience, innovation and the defence industrial base as examples. The language recognises that a modern alliance can be disrupted without a tank crossing a border.

The split creates political room and accounting risk. A government can invest in ports, energy networks or cyber systems that genuinely improve security. It can also be tempted to relabel ordinary infrastructure as defence spending. The credibility of the pledge will depend on common reporting and national scrutiny.

NATO officials say the target will be assessed through the alliance's planning and reporting mechanisms. The declaration schedules a review in 2029, giving allies time to adjust the path and reassess the threat. The review also means that the number is not a single irreversible annual jump.

For countries spending close to 2 percent, reaching 3.5 percent in ten years requires sustained increases. For countries below the old benchmark, the challenge is larger. The economic burden is measured against GDP, so a recession can make the ratio rise even when nominal spending does not.

The target also interacts with European fiscal rules. Member states must finance more defence while managing debt and investment. Germany's March constitutional reform gives Berlin additional room, but other governments will need their own legal routes. The alliance's common ambition will therefore be expressed through very different national politics.

Industrial capacity is another constraint. Orders for air defence, ammunition, drones and secure communications compete for factories and skilled workers. If every ally buys the same scarce systems at once, prices rise and delivery times stretch. If they buy separately, Europe may spend more without becoming more interoperable.

NATO's language on burden-sharing is designed to push governments towards joint planning. The practical question is whether national procurement agencies and defence companies can turn the political target into coordinated production. A percentage is a signal; capability is the output.

Trump gets the headline. Europe gets the work

The summit was carefully managed around the US president.

Trump has long argued that European allies do not spend enough and has questioned whether Washington should continue carrying the same share of NATO's defence burden. In The Hague, the leaders gave him a large number and a declaration affirming their commitment to collective defence.

That was a diplomatic calculation. Keeping the United States engaged remains vital while Russia tests European security and the war in Ukraine continues. The pledge makes it harder for Washington to say that Europe is refusing responsibility.

It also creates a new political dependency. European governments cannot implement 5 percent by relying on American approval. They have to decide whether the money goes to national forces, European projects, US equipment or a mix. The alliance does not prescribe a single model.

Trump met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the summit's margins. He said higher NATO spending could deter future Russian aggression and repeated his view that Putin wanted the war to end. The meeting produced no announced settlement or new guarantee for Ukraine.

NATO's summit statement affirmed continued support for Ukraine, but Ukraine was not given a membership timetable. The decision reflects the alliance's attempt to keep the US engaged and avoid a debate that would split allies. It also leaves Kyiv reliant on national contributions and other coalitions for immediate support.

European Council leaders meeting in Brussels the following day reiterated support for Ukraine and the need to increase European defence expenditure. The two institutions are moving in the same direction, but their tools differ. NATO sets military requirements; the EU can shape industrial finance, sanctions and economic coordination.

The United Kingdom's role illustrates the overlap. London is outside the EU but inside NATO and had just concluded a security and defence partnership with Brussels. The Hague pledge gives that relationship a larger strategic context. British participation in European procurement could help, but the terms remain to be negotiated.

For France, the target raises questions about strategic autonomy and the balance between national industry and US suppliers. For Poland and the Baltic states, proximity to Russia makes rapid capability growth more urgent. For Spain, the 5 percent figure is politically and economically difficult. A unanimous declaration contains all three realities.

The summit therefore shows Europe acting collectively without becoming uniform. The alliance has chosen a direction. National governments will decide how far, how fast and with which partners they travel.

Spain's reservation is the test of unanimity

Spain's position was the most visible limit on the agreement.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said his country could not meet the target as presented. The final text uses the collective formula that allies commit to the investment, while leaving national pathways and the broader 1.5 percent category to be defined through planning. The declaration survived, but the dispute did not disappear.

This is not simply a quarrel over one country's willingness to pay. Spain's economy, threat assessment and defence structure differ from those of Poland or Finland. A common target that ignores those differences will produce either non-compliance or creative accounting.

Other allies have their own reservations. Governments must explain why spending on hospitals, climate resilience or border infrastructure should count as security and how much of it can be included. Parliaments will ask whether NATO is setting policy that should belong to elected national institutions.

The 2029 review is intended to manage that tension. It gives allies a date to assess progress, threats and economic conditions before the 2035 endpoint. It also creates a political deadline that future governments cannot ignore. Defence planners can work in ten-year horizons; voters elect governments for much shorter ones.

A second issue is distribution. If Europe spends more but buys from outside Europe, the security benefit may be immediate while industrial capacity remains elsewhere. If it insists on domestic production, costs may rise and delivery slow. Joint procurement offers a compromise but requires countries to surrender some control over specifications and timing.

The 5 percent pledge also competes with the political promise that more defence will not reduce social spending. That promise can hold in a growing economy or through higher taxes and borrowing. It becomes harder during stagnation. NATO's declaration does not answer the domestic question of who pays.

The alliance can improve transparency by publishing comparable data and capability milestones. It can distinguish core military investment from wider resilience spending and show whether money produces usable forces. Such reporting would protect the target from becoming a rhetorical number.

The larger risk is that allies meet the ratio while remaining vulnerable in the areas that matter. A country can spend heavily on personnel and still lack ammunition. It can build infrastructure that is not protected from cyber attack. It can buy advanced aircraft without the logistics to operate them.

That is why the summit's most consequential work is technical. Defence ministries will translate political language into capability targets, procurement contracts and readiness exercises. Parliament will decide whether to fund them. NATO commanders will test whether they work together.

The Hague declaration is unanimous because it postpones some of those choices. Its success will depend on whether the postponement is used for planning or avoidance.

A pledge that changes the European argument

The 2025 summit leaves NATO with a higher benchmark and governments with fewer excuses for avoiding the security debate.

The old 2 percent target was already contested, but Russia's invasion of Ukraine and uncertainty over US engagement changed its political meaning. Five percent sets a scale large enough to affect tax policy, industrial planning and the future of European welfare states.

The alliance has not decided that every euro should go to weapons. The second pillar recognises resilience, cyber security and critical infrastructure as part of deterrence. That is a more realistic account of modern conflict, but it also makes the boundary of eligible spending harder to police.

Ukraine remains the immediate test. European leaders can increase support through national budgets and joint instruments, but the 5 percent target is measured against long-term spending, not the next shipment of ammunition. A government can meet its trajectory while Kyiv faces a shortfall this winter.

The US role remains equally unresolved. Trump accepted the pledge and claimed credit for pushing allies towards it. European leaders welcomed the American commitment to Article 5. Neither side has described how responsibilities will be divided in a crisis or how US forces in Europe will be affected by the spending shift.

NATO's strength has always been political as well as military. The Hague statement preserves the political promise of mutual defence. The new target will test whether public support can survive the costs of turning that promise into capacity.

By the end of June, the number was fixed, the categories were outlined and the review date was set. Spain's reservation showed that unanimity is not the same as uniformity. The next stage will take place in capitals, parliaments and factories.

Europe has been told to spend more on its own defence. The useful question is no longer whether the alliance can announce a larger target. It is whether the money will produce forces, infrastructure and resilience that make the promise credible when the next crisis arrives. The alliance will need to publish enough detail for citizens to see the difference between a larger budget and stronger protection. Defence ministers will need to show which capabilities are missing, procurement offices will need to show where contracts are going and finance ministers will need to explain the trade-offs in plain language. The pledge will survive its first test only if governments can demonstrate that spending is additional, coordinated and connected to a real requirement. Otherwise the argument will return at the next summit with a different number and the same unresolved question: what, exactly, did Europe buy? The answer has to be visible in readiness reports, exercise results and equipment delivered to allied units. It also has to survive elections in countries where voters may prefer hospitals, housing or tax relief to distant promises about 2035. The Hague pledge is a security commitment, but it is also a domestic political contract for the decade ahead now.