Navalny is dead. His widow asks Europe to change the way it confronts Putin.

Yulia Navalnaya stood before the European Parliament on 28 February with a demand that went beyond another expression of sympathy. She asked European politicians to confront Vladimir Putin's system through the people, money and networks that sustain it, arguing that familiar diplomatic routines were insufficient.

Twelve days earlier, Russia's prison service had announced that her husband, Alexei Navalny, had died at the IK-3 penal colony in Kharp, above the Arctic Circle. He was 47. The service said he had become unwell after a walk and that attempts to revive him had failed.

That account did not establish an independently verified cause of death. Navalny's family and allies accused the authorities of killing him. European governments held the Russian state and Putin responsible for the treatment and detention of a political opponent whose rights they had repeatedly said were being violated.

The immediate response moved through several institutions. EU foreign ministers met Navalnaya on 19 February. Britain sanctioned six prison officials on 21 February. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on 29 February calling for accountability and stronger support for Russian civil society.

A funeral in Moscow was announced for 1 March, beyond the end of this month's account. Navalnaya expressed concern about whether mourners would be able to attend safely. Even the act of saying farewell had become part of the confrontation between the state and the people who opposed it.

What is known, and what the authorities must explain

Navalny died in state custody after years of imprisonment and repeated complaints about his conditions. That places responsibility for his protection with the authorities controlling the prison. It also means those authorities control much of the evidence needed to reconstruct his final days.

The announced sequence of illness and attempted resuscitation is only the beginning of an investigation. Medical records, the timing of treatment, witness accounts and an independent examination would be needed to test it. A brief prison statement cannot answer whether his care was adequate or whether other actions contributed to his death.

UN human rights experts called for an independent investigation, including an autopsy separate from the state authorities implicated in his detention. Their demand reflects the conflict of interest when the institution responsible for a prisoner is also the principal source of information about how he died.

The OSCE's human rights office likewise called for a credible investigation and access for Navalny's representatives. Those are practical requirements, not simply diplomatic adjectives. Independence concerns who can examine evidence and publish findings; transparency concerns whether the family and public can scrutinise the process.

Political responsibility and a specific criminal allegation should remain distinct. European leaders can hold the Russian authorities accountable for the detention and treatment of Navalny without claiming that an independently established forensic account is already public. The second claim requires evidence beyond the first.

That distinction does not require accepting the Kremlin's version. It requires refusing to let an untested official explanation fill an evidential gap. It also protects the credibility of any later findings by separating what was known in February from what investigators may establish subsequently.

The family's difficulty obtaining information and arranging the release of the body became a further dispute. Navalny's team described obstruction and pressure; the authorities retained control over the relevant procedures. These exchanges need attribution because outside observers could not independently witness every interaction.

A death in custody is not made politically unimportant by uncertainty over its immediate medical cause. Conditions of confinement, access to treatment and the legal basis of imprisonment are themselves matters of responsibility. A narrow debate over the final minutes can distract from those preceding decisions.

The record also concerns other prisoners. UN experts named Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin and Alexei Gorinov among people whose detention and health required attention. Their cases should not become visible only if another death produces an international crisis.

For governments seeking accountability, the first task is therefore to preserve evidence and demand access while identifying those still at risk. Sanctions and public condemnation can accompany that work. They cannot perform the functions of a doctor, a lawyer or an investigator denied entry.

A movement loses the person around whom it was built

Navalny's political importance came partly from his ability to connect corruption investigations with a broader challenge to the governing system. His team used digital media to reach audiences beyond state television and turned investigations into arguments about who benefited from political power.

His imprisonment had already forced much of that work to continue without his physical presence. Communications, legal representation and colleagues outside Russia helped sustain it. Death changes the relationship fundamentally: a imprisoned leader can still speak and direct, however constrained; a movement organised around his name must now decide how authority is carried forward.

Navalnaya said she would continue his work. Her meetings with European ministers and speech in Strasbourg gave that declaration immediate international visibility. They did not automatically resolve questions of organisation, strategy or representation within Russia's diverse opposition.

European governments should avoid treating the person most accessible in western capitals as the uncontested representative of everyone opposing Putin. Navalnaya has a powerful public role and a direct connection to the movement. Other activists, regional networks and political traditions retain their own priorities and histories.

The distinction matters for support. Independent journalism, legal defence and the preservation of civic networks can benefit people with differing political views. Assistance tied too closely to one personality risks narrowing the constituency it is intended to help.

Inside Russia, public mourning itself carries risks. Reports of detentions at commemorations demonstrate why the absence of large open protests cannot be read straightforwardly as approval of the authorities. People may be frightened, isolated or unsure whether others will act with them.

Nor should every act of commemoration be treated as support for a complete political programme. A person laying flowers may be expressing grief, anger at abuse or opposition to repression without endorsing every position Navalny held. The evidence supports describing the act, not assigning an entire ideology to the participant.

Navalny's earlier political record also generated disagreements, including criticism of nationalist positions. A serious account can acknowledge that history while condemning arbitrary imprisonment and demanding accountability for his death. The right to lawful treatment does not depend on agreement with a prisoner's politics.

The coming presidential election provides the immediate political setting. Putin's opponents face a system in which meaningful competition has been heavily constrained. Navalny's death removes a prominent alternative voice, but it does not by itself determine how every dissatisfied Russian will respond.

For the remaining movement, keeping people safe and maintaining communication may be more useful than setting expectations of a sudden national uprising. Dramatic predictions can obscure the patient organisational work required under repression and expose participants to demands made from safer places abroad.

Six sanctions, and the question of what they can change

Britain's 21 February measures target six senior officials associated with the penal colony, including its head, Vadim Kalinin. They impose travel restrictions and asset freezes under the UK's human rights sanctions framework. This is a completed government action, unlike proposals that remain under discussion.

An asset freeze applies to relevant property within the jurisdiction; it does not establish that a listed official holds substantial assets there. The practical financial effect depends on what can be identified and controlled. A designation can still restrict future access and signal personal consequences even where immediate holdings are limited.

The measures should therefore be assessed on several levels. They identify officials whom the government holds responsible for abusive treatment. They constrain dealings within the scope of UK law. Their ability to change behaviour inside a Russian prison is a further question, not an automatic result.

EU foreign ministers discussed additional action after meeting Navalnaya. Borrell also proposed associating the EU's human rights sanctions framework with Navalny's name. Political agreement to consider measures should not be confused with a completed Council decision listing every person under discussion.

Navalnaya's Strasbourg argument pushed beyond officials closest to the prison. She urged scrutiny of the networks that sustain the Kremlin, including financial and professional relationships outside Russia. That broadens the policy challenge from condemnation of a particular facility to enforcement against systems that can conceal wealth and influence.

Such work is demanding. Authorities need reliable ownership information, evidence of control and cooperation across borders. Lawyers, banks and service providers operate under different national systems, and nominal ownership may not identify the person who actually benefits from an asset.

Accusations alone are insufficient for defensible listings or enforcement action. Governments need criteria, evidence and procedures capable of surviving judicial review. That is not merely a legal inconvenience: weak cases can be overturned, allowing those targeted to claim that the entire sanctions policy is arbitrary.

At the same time, enforcement cannot be judged only by how many names appear in a press release. Investigating evasion, tracing beneficial ownership and acting on breaches can matter more than adding a new list without the staff to implement it. Navalnaya's emphasis on networks makes that administrative capacity especially relevant.

The response also needs to distinguish measures linked to repression from the wider sanctions imposed over Russia's war against Ukraine. Both concern the same state, but their legal purposes and target criteria differ. Combining every announcement into one undifferentiated package makes it harder to assess what a measure is designed to achieve.

The European Parliament's resolution increases political pressure but does not itself freeze assets. Member states and the Council must make and implement the relevant decisions. The gap between a parliamentary demand and an executive measure is where the next test of Europe's response will occur.

The people who still need protection

The strongest case for immediate action concerns prisoners whose health and access to lawyers can still be improved. European governments can raise named cases, seek information and coordinate pressure so that a detainee is not dependent on a single country's intermittent attention.

Legal access is particularly important because it connects an isolated prisoner with people able to record conditions and pursue complaints. Protecting lawyers and documenting interference with their work belongs in the same policy as protecting their clients. Without that link, abuse becomes harder to detect before an emergency.

Support for families also has practical value. Travel, legal fees, communication and uncertainty over detention can impose heavy costs. Programmes serving those needs may be less visible than a summit declaration but can preserve the ability to challenge mistreatment.

People working outside Russia face a different set of obstacles. Residency status, banking access and the security of communications can determine whether independent media or civil-society organisations continue functioning. European policy should distinguish restrictions aimed at the Russian state from barriers that unintentionally disable its critics.

That requires careful administration rather than a blanket assumption that every Russian citizen abroad is either an opponent or an agent of the Kremlin. Individual evidence and clear procedures are essential. Overbroad exclusion can undermine the very networks European leaders say they want to sustain.

Prisoner releases may also involve diplomacy that cannot be fully public while discussions are active. The possibility of negotiation should not be presented as evidence that a particular exchange has been agreed. Speculation can raise expectations for families and obscure what governments have actually secured.

Navalny's death does not make contact with Moscow irrelevant. It changes the questions governments must ask about the purpose of that contact. Channels used to seek access, protect detainees or negotiate humanitarian outcomes have a different function from high-profile meetings intended to display normal relations.

Europe's support for Ukraine remains central to confronting Russian aggression, but it is not a complete policy towards Russian society. Ukrainians' security and the protection of people persecuted inside Russia are distinct responsibilities that can be pursued together. One should not become a rhetorical substitute for the other.

The month closes with a family preparing a funeral, a movement trying to continue and governments promising accountability. The announced sanctions are concrete; an independent account of the death is still absent. The most useful measure of the next response will be whether it changes access, protection or the operation of enabling networks, rather than the intensity of another tribute.

Navalnaya has asked European politicians to adapt their methods to the system they confront. The request leaves them with a practical choice. They can add Navalny's name to the language of policy, or they can examine where the existing policy failed to protect a prisoner whose danger was already well known and change the work done for those who remain.