Erdoğan wins again, and Europe’s waiting game is over

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won Turkey’s presidential runoff on 28 May, defeating the opposition’s joint candidate and securing another five-year term after two decades in power. The near-complete results reported after the vote put him at roughly 52.2 per cent against Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s 47.8 per cent. The contest was close enough to show a divided country and clear enough to end the opposition’s immediate prospect of replacing him.

Erdoğan celebrated the result in Istanbul and Ankara, presenting it as a victory for the whole country. Kılıçdaroğlu said the contest had been unfair and promised to continue the political struggle. International observers reported the following day that voters had a real choice and that the runoff was well administered, while the campaign remained unequal and the incumbent enjoyed an unjustified advantage.

The result matters to Europe because several difficult negotiations had been waiting on the election. Turkey still has to decide on Sweden’s NATO accession. It remains central to migration management and to diplomatic channels with Russia. Its economic choices affect European businesses and the stability of a large neighbouring country.

The election removes uncertainty about the person European governments will face. It does not remove uncertainty about his next decisions. A renewed mandate can give Erdoğan room to adjust economic policy or settle a dispute; it can also reinforce his belief that the approach he has used so far continues to work.

The first round changed the opposition’s problem

The 14 May vote returned no outright presidential winner. Erdoğan finished just below the required majority, ahead of Kılıçdaroğlu, while nationalist candidate Sinan Oğan held a smaller but potentially consequential share. The parliamentary election held the same day gave Erdoğan’s alliance a majority. That result shaped the second round before either candidate began the final fortnight of campaigning.

Kılıçdaroğlu had led a broad alliance of parties seeking to restore a parliamentary system and reduce the concentration of power in the presidency. The coalition brought together groups with different ideological traditions around the immediate objective of defeating Erdoğan. It needed voters to believe that changing the president would produce a workable government rather than a new period of institutional conflict.

After 14 May, that argument became harder. Even an opposition presidential victory would have faced a Parliament controlled by Erdoğan’s allies. The incumbent could campaign on continuity between the executive and legislature, while the opposition had to explain how it would govern and pursue constitutional reform without the parliamentary result it had hoped to obtain.

The first-round outcome also defeated an assumption held by some of Erdoğan’s opponents: that high inflation and criticism of the earthquake response would be sufficient to turn the election. Those issues mattered, but they did not operate independently of party identification, leadership preferences, media exposure and concerns about security. The electorate was not making a single-issue judgment on the economy.

Nationalist voters became a particular focus between the rounds. Oğan endorsed Erdoğan, while Ümit Özdağ, leader of the Victory Party that had backed Oğan, supported Kılıçdaroğlu after negotiating an agreement. The split showed why a defeated candidate’s votes cannot be treated as property transferable by endorsement. Voters could respond differently from the leaders claiming to represent them.

Kılıçdaroğlu hardened his language on refugees and promised returns, seeking to reach voters who wanted a tougher migration policy. That move complicated the coalition he already had to maintain, including support from Kurdish voters and others concerned about rights and representation. Expanding towards one group risked making existing supporters less confident about the programme.

Erdoğan emphasised national security and attacked the opposition’s relationship with Kurdish political forces. Those allegations need to be distinguished from established evidence of criminal links. Kurdish electoral participation and support for an opposition candidate are not equivalent to support for an armed organisation. The campaign’s tendency to blur such distinctions formed part of the observers’ concern about inflammatory language.

The final result shows that the opposition did not overcome the first-round deficit. It does not tell us precisely how every group moved between ballots. Claims that one endorsement or one campaign slogan alone decided the runoff would require voter-level evidence that a national tally cannot provide. The firmer conclusion is that Erdoğan retained a majority within the coalition of voters assembled behind him.

A real contest on an unequal field

The international observers’ assessment was deliberately more precise than a choice between declaring the election wholly free or wholly meaningless. They reported genuine political alternatives, high participation and generally effective administration. They also identified unequal campaign conditions, biased media coverage and advantages arising from the incumbent’s position.

Those findings concern different stages of an election. A ballot can be counted competently while the information and opportunities available to voters before polling day remain uneven. Conversely, criticism of the campaign environment does not by itself establish that every recorded vote was fabricated. A serious account needs to examine the specific shortcomings rather than substitute a single label.

Media exposure is especially important in a presidential contest because candidates need to reach voters beyond their own party networks. An incumbent who appears extensively in official coverage and enjoys favourable treatment has an advantage that campaign rallies or social media do not necessarily offset. The issue is the conditions under which voters encounter the alternatives.

The boundary between state activity and campaigning also matters. Government announcements, public ceremonies and the use of official resources can reinforce the image of a leader as the only figure able to deliver. Some presidential activity must continue during an election, but a democratic contest requires rules preventing that necessity from becoming an unlimited campaign subsidy.

Observers also raised concerns about discriminatory and inflammatory rhetoric during the runoff. Such language can affect who feels able to participate and can make compromise harder after the result. Erdoğan’s election-night appeal to national unity will therefore be tested against the treatment of people and groups portrayed as threats during the campaign.

The EU’s response after the first round welcomed participation and called for the shortcomings identified by observers to be addressed. The second-round findings indicate that the unequal conditions had not been resolved in the intervening period. Congratulations on a result should not erase that assessment, just as criticism of the conditions should not erase the political support Erdoğan demonstrably retains.

For the opposition, this creates a difficult strategic debate. It must examine its candidate, coalition and message while recognising the obstacles it faced. Attributing everything to an unfair system would leave choices within its control unexamined. Attributing everything to campaign tactics would understate the institutional environment in which those choices were made.

The result has not abolished political competition. Large numbers voted for a change of government, and opposition parties retain important constituencies and local organisations. The immediate question is how they preserve cooperation after a defeat that will expose disagreements over responsibility. A common desire to win the presidency was easier to maintain than a shared explanation of why the effort failed.

The opposition’s control of major municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara after the 2019 elections, gives it a continuing base from which to demonstrate governing capacity. Local success does not automatically translate into a national presidential majority, as this contest has shown. It does provide institutions, public visibility and a record that the opposition can defend or improve while deciding how to rebuild its national strategy.

Sweden’s application returns to the table

For NATO allies, the clearest near-term test is Sweden’s membership application. Finland entered the alliance in April, but Sweden remains outside because the necessary ratifications are incomplete. Turkey has demanded action on organisations and activities it links to terrorism, while Sweden points to legal changes and cooperation undertaken in response.

The June 2022 memorandum supplies a framework for those discussions. It does not specify that a Turkish election victory automatically triggers ratification. Erdoğan can decide that the new mandate gives him room to conclude the process, or continue pressing for further action. Other allies should not treat the end of campaigning as proof that the dispute has ended.

The Turkish Parliament also has a formal role. Erdoğan’s alliance majority helps him pursue the policy he chooses, but parliamentary ratification remains a distinct step. A presidential statement of intent and a completed accession procedure are different events. Sweden and its partners will look for the latter.

The dispute has been shaped by competing legal and political expectations. Turkish officials have sought action against individuals and organisations. Swedish authorities operate within domestic law, judicial independence and protections for expression. A government can change legislation or improve cooperation without being able to guarantee every extradition or prevent every offensive demonstration.

That creates limits to a bargain based only on personal assurances between leaders. If Ankara requires outcomes Stockholm cannot lawfully promise, another summit conversation will not solve the problem. The practical route requires commitments specific enough to evaluate and compatible with the institutions expected to implement them.

Turkey’s importance to NATO ensures that allies will keep negotiating. Its geography, armed forces and role around the Black Sea give the relationship weight beyond one accession dispute. That weight also explains why the argument cannot be reduced to whether other governments like Erdoğan’s domestic politics. Alliance cooperation requires dealing with the government that holds authority.

Europe still needs a policy for the relationship it has

Migration will remain another central point of contact. Turkey hosts a large refugee population, particularly Syrians, and the EU has invested substantial political and financial effort in cooperation. The election campaign’s pressure for returns does not settle where people could safely go or which procedures would apply. Those questions remain after the slogans have served their electoral purpose.

European governments have an interest in stable arrangements, but that interest should not make the rights and safety of displaced people disappear from the negotiation. A plan can reduce pressure on one government while transferring risk to people with little influence over it. The relevant test is how the policy is implemented, not simply how many returns a leader promises.

Relations with Russia present a different balance. Turkey has supported Ukraine in several areas while retaining economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow. Its role in Black Sea diplomacy gives Europe a reason to value those channels. The same relationship generates concern where cooperation with Russia weakens the pressure European governments are trying to maintain.

Erdoğan’s victory suggests continuity in the use of those overlapping relationships. It does not establish the exact choices he will make in a future dispute. European capitals need to identify the areas where interests align and the areas where incentives or restrictions are required. Waiting for a more congenial leader was never a substitute for that policy work.

The economy is the largest unresolved domestic pressure. Inflation and the cost of living remain problems despite the electoral victory, while reconstruction after February’s earthquakes requires resources and sustained administration. The next appointments and policy announcements will indicate whether Erdoğan adjusts the economic approach or treats the result as an endorsement of its continuation.

At the end of May, those decisions have not yet been fully revealed. It would be premature to write a new economic team or a monetary-policy reversal into the election result. Investors and households face a real distinction between the certainty of who has won and the uncertainty of how the new term will be managed.

The European relationship will be judged partly through that distinction too. A more stable economic policy could create room for cooperation without resolving disagreements over rights, migration or NATO. A renewed confrontation over one issue would not necessarily end cooperation on every other. Turkey’s relationships are too extensive for a single diplomatic label to describe them.

Erdoğan has won another term, and the opposition has failed to achieve the transfer of power it sought. Europe’s next choices are consequently immediate rather than hypothetical: pursue Sweden’s ratification, maintain practical channels on Ukraine and migration, and keep its assessment of democratic conditions separate from the necessity of dealing with the president. The ballot has settled the leadership. It has left the negotiations intact.